Shannon [11, 12] in celebrated works had shown that n bits of shared key is necessary and sufficient to transmit n-bit classical information in an information-theoretically secure way. Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf in [1] considered a more general setting, referred to as Private quantum channels, in which instead of classical information, quantum states are required to be transmitted and only one-way communication is allowed. They show that in this case 2n bits of shared key is necessary and sufficient to transmit an n-qubit state. We consider the most general setting in which we allow for all possible combinations i.e. we let the input to be transmitted, the message sent and the shared resources to be classical/quantum. We develop a general framework by which we are able to show simultaneously tight bounds on communication/shared resources in all of these cases and this includes the results of Shannon and Ambainis et al.
channels that use entanglement between Alice and Bob to achieve security, and in order to distinguish them from PQCs which use classical shared keys, we call them PQCEs. We formally define a PQCE as follows. We have the following security requirement that ∀|φ ∈ S, E(|φ ) = ρ.
Bob's operations: Bob on receiving the quantum message from Alice attaches a few ancilla qubits in the state |0 to the combined system of the received message and his part of the bi-partite state |ψ AB . He then performs a unitary transformation on the combined system of all her qubits and outputs a subset of the resulting qubits. Let B represent Bob's operations. Let for input state |φ to Alice the final (decoded) output of Bob be represented by D(|φ ).
We have the following correctness requirement that ∀|φ ∈ S, D(|φ ) = |φ φ|.
Then [S, A, B, |ψ AB , ρ] is called a private quantum channel with entanglement (PQCE).
Note:
1. From our description the mapping E : |φ → E(|φ ) (and extended by linearity to mixed states) from Alice's input to her message, forms a quantum operation (see Section 3 for definition) since it is a composition of quantum operations, like attaching a fixed ancilla, performing unitary transformation and tracing out a subsystem.
2. In the above definition of a PQCE, if we replace the bi-partite shared pure state |ψ AB with shared random strings between Alice and Bob, we get a PQC. We represent a PQC by [S, A, B, P, ρ], where P is the distribution of the shared random strings between Alice and Bob.
3. In [1] the authors have made a comment that in the case of PQC's, without loss of generality, Alice's operations can be thought of as the following. On receiving the input she attaches a fixed mixed state ancilla ρ to it, applies a unitary U i depending on the shared random string i on the combined system of the input and the ancilla and sends the resulting qubits to Bob. Please note that we do not make such an assumption here which in any case does not apply for PQCE's. Also it is clear from the above definition that for both PQC's and PQCE's, the operations of Alice and Bob are as general as possible.
4.
A PQCE/PQC for S is also PQCE/PQC respectively forS which is the closure of S under convex combinations.
PQCEs were also considered by Leung [6] by the name of Quantum Vernam Cipher who considered issues like security of key recycling and reliability of message transfer. In this paper we are primarily concerned with bounds on communication and entanglement requirements of PQCEs. We consider the following measures of our various resources:
• Measure of communication: For a PQC [S, A, B, P, ρ] and a PQCE [S, A, B, |ψ AB , ρ], we let the measure of communication to be S(ρ). When we say that it requires 'n (qu)bits of communication' we mean S(ρ) = n.
• Measure of entanglement: For a bi-partite pure state |ψ AB , consider its Schmidt decomposition,
, where {|a i } is an orthonormal set and so is {|b i }, λ i ≥ 0 and i λ i = 1. The measure of entanglement of |ψ AB is defined to
, we let the measure of entanglement to be E(|ψ AB ). When we say that it requires n ebits of entanglement we mean E(|ψ AB ) = n.
• Measure of shared randomness: For a PQC [S, A, B, P, ρ], we let the measure of shared randomness be S(P ). When we say that it requires n bits of shared randomness we mean S(P ) = n.
We consider all possible cases i.e. when the input to Alice, the message sent by Alice and the shared resource between Alice and Bob is either classical or quantum. We develop a general argument by which we are able to show tight bounds simultaneously on communication and shared resource usage in all the above cases. Following is a compilation of all the results we obtain due to our analysis. Below when we say the "x,y,z" case (e.g. classical, quantum, classical case) we mean, Alice gets n-(qu)bits of x input, the communication is y and the shared resource is z.
Result 1.4
1. In the classical, classical, classical case, n bits of communication and n bits of shared key is required. The one-time pad scheme hence is simultaneously optimal in both communication and shared key usage. This is basically Shannon's result [11, 12] [4] .
(This scheme was pointed by to us by Nayak who in turn was pointed to by Gottesman).
Finally we discuss two-way multiple round PQCs (MPQCs) and PQCEs (MPQCEs). We show that an MPQC which can transfer an n-qubit state must use n-bits of classical shared keys. Also an MPQCE which can transfer an n-qubit state must use Ω(n) ebits of entanglement. Hence there is not much saving even when multiple rounds are allowed.
Organization of the paper
In the next section we make a few definitions and state a few facts which we will be using later in our proofs. In Section 4 we present the proofs of all the parts of Result 1.4. In Section 5 we discuss two-way multiple round private quantum channels and finally conclude with a few remarks in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Let H k represent the Hilbert space of dimension k. Let C k represent the set of quantum states corresponding to the standard basis of H k , also referred to as the classical states. Let I k represent the identity transformation in a k dimensional space. For an operator A let A ≥ 0 represent that A is a positive semi-definite operator. By a quantum operation we mean a linear, completely positive, trace-preserving operation. Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. For a state ρ ∈ K, we call a pure state |φ ∈ H ⊗ K, a purification of ρ if Tr H |φ φ| = ρ.
Let us represent the four Pauli operators in the standard basis as σ 0
Let us identify a state in C 2 2n as a string
. . x n ) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} n in the natural way by pairing up the bits from left to right.
(|00 + |11 ). For s ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, the states (σ s ⊗ I)|EPR are referred to as the four Bell states. Please note that all the four Bell states are orthogonal to each other.
For a quantum state ρ with eigenvalues λ i its von-Neumann entropy is defined as S(ρ) ∆ = − i λ i log λ i . Given a joint quantum system AB, the mutual information between them is defined as I(A : B) ∆ = S(A) + S(B) − S(AB). Relative entropy between two states ρ and σ is defined as S(ρ|σ) ∆ = Trρ(log ρ − log σ). We require the following properties of von-Neumann entropy, relative entropy and mutual information. Please refer to [10] for a good introduction to quantum information theory. 
Given a joint system AB with A being a classical system, S(AB) ≥ max{S(A), S(B)}.
We will need the following theorem. We will also need the following Substate theorem from [5] .
where Tr|ρ ′ − ρ| ≤ 0.1.
Resource bounds
We first derive a few lemmas which will finally lead us to our results. In [1] it is shown that a PQC which can transmit n-qubit quantum states can be converted into a PQC which uses the same amount of shared classical randomness to transmit any 2n bit classical state. We show a similar thing for PQCE's. Following lemma states the same. In order to prove this lemma we first prove here another lemma which is very similar to a lemma from [1] . Lemma 4.2 Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. Let E be a quantum operation acting on H such that ∀|φ ∈ H, E(|φ φ|) = ρ. Let |φ 1 , |φ 2 ∈ H be two orthogonal states, then E(|φ 1 φ 2 |) = E(|φ 2 φ 1 |) = 0.
Proof: We note the following:
Now (1) and (2) imply E(|φ 1 φ 2 |) + E(|φ 2 φ 1 |) = 0 and (1) and (3) 
We get the following corollary of the above lemma:
Corollary 4.3 Let H, K be Hilbert spaces. Let E be a quantum operation acting on H such that ∀|φ ∈ H, E(|φ φ|) = ρ. Then ∀|ψ ∈ K ⊗ H, (I ⊗ E)(|ψ ψ|) = (Tr H |ψ ψ|) ⊗ ρ. This also means that for all mixed states σ ∈ K ⊗ H, (I ⊗ E)σ = (Tr
Proof: Let |ψ = i √ λ i |a i ⊗ |b i , be as written in the Schmidt decomposition form. Then,
, let x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} n correspond to the input state. Alice prepares n EPR pairs and applies the unitary σ x on combined system of the first qubits of each pair. She then encrypts the combined system of the second qubits of each pair using E, the encryption operation of the PQCE, [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ]. She now sends all the resulting qubits to Bob. From above corollary, we can see that the state of the message of this new PQCE will be I 2 n ⊗ρ for all inputs in C 2 2n . The decryption operation B ′ of Bob now corresponds to first decrypting the second half of the received qubits using B and then recovering the input classical state by making measurements on the n-Bell states. Below we show a similar lemma which implies that a PQC/PQCE which transmits any n-qubit quantum state can be converted into a PQC/PQCE which uses the same communication and extra n ebits of entanglement to transmit any 2n bit classical state. We show the proof for PQCEs and a similar proof holds for PQCs as well. 
, let x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} n correspond to the input state. Alice applies σ x to her part of the extra n-EPR pairs, encodes them using the encoding procedure of the earlier PQCE [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ], and sends the resulting qubits to Bob. The security property of [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ] implies the security property
On receiving Alice's message, Bob first applies the decoding procedure of [H 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , ρ], and recovers x by making measurements on the n-Bell states. We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Let ABX be a tripartite system. Then,
S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ min{2S(A), 2S(B)}.

If AX is a classical system then we have the stronger inequality S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ min{S(A), S(B)}.
I(A : B) ≤ min{2S(A), 2S(B)}.
Proof:
1.
S(AX) − S(ABX) + S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(AX) − S(ABX) + S(B) ≤ S(B) + S(B) = 2S(B)
Above first inequality comes from part (1) and second inequality comes from part (4) of Fact 3.1. Similarly we get S(AX) + S(BX) − S(ABX) − S(X) ≤ 2S(A).
S(AX) − S(ABX) + S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(BX) − S(X) ≤ S(B)
Above first inequality arises from part (6), since AX is a classical system, and the second inequality comes from part (1) of Fact 3.1. Again, since A is a classical system, we get
Above the first inequality comes from part (6) and the second inequality comes from part (1) of Fact 3.1.
I(A : B) = S(A) + S(B) − S(AB) ≤ S(A) + S(A) = 2S(A)
The inequality above follows from part (4) of Fact 3.1.
We now have the following theorem.
, where σ B is the quantum state corresponding to Bob's part of |ψ AB . We note from definitions that S(σ B ) = E(|ψ AB ).
S(ρ) ≥ n/2.
Proof: Let X be a random variable which takes values in {1, 2, ...., 2 n } uniformly and through the PQCE Alice is able to communicate X to Bob. We can assume that the operations of Alice are safe on X which means that at the beginning Alice makes a copy of X (since it is a classical state) and then her subsequent operations do not touch the original copy of X. Let M 1 be the quantum state corresponding to the message of Alice and let M 2 be the quantum state corresponding to Bob's part of |ψ AB . Then from Fact 3.1,
Above, first inequality comes from part (2) of Fact 3.1. I(M 1 : X) = 0 because of the privacy property of the channel. I(M 2 : X) = 0 because they were independent to begin with and Alice's operations are safe on X. The last inequality follows from part (1) of Lemma 4.5. We note in the proof of Theorem 4.6, due to part (2) of Lemma 4.5, that if either M 2 is a classical system (as in a PQC) or if M 1 is a classical system (when the message is classical), then we get n ≤ min{S(M 2 ), S(M 1 )}. Therefore we have the following corollary:
2. If [C 2 n , A, B, |ψ AB , P ] is a PQCE with classical communication then, S(σ) ≥ n, where σ is Bob's part of |ψ AB , and S(P ) ≥ n.
We are now set to show various parts of Result 1.4. Proof: Lower bound on entanglement follows from the fact that a PQCE for H 2 n is also a PQCE for C 2 n and Part (2) 
Multiple round private quantum channels
When we consider two-way multiple round PQCs (denoted MPQC) or multiple round PQCEs (MPQCE), we note that keeping the privacy of individual messages cannot be the only criteria. For example let us consider a protocol in which in the first message Alice transfers EPR pairs followed by a junk message of Bob and then Alice transfers her quantum state privately using the earlier sent EPR pairs. In this protocol none of the individual messages give any information about the transfered state but it does not mean that Eve, who can access the channel in all rounds, cannot get any information about the transfered state. We note that while considering multiple round private classical channels, in which the communication is classical, we can consider all the messages of Alice and Bob together and put the requirement that they together should not reveal any information about Alice's input state. Hence we get exactly the same resource requirements as for one round private classical channels. But we cannot do this in case of quantum communication since all the messages together do not make any sense. We therefore consider two possible definitions of MPQCs and MPQCEs. We define MPQCs and MPQCEs are similar with only shared randomness replaced by shared entanglement.
MPQCs without abort:
In this case Alice and Bob never abort the protocol but satisfy the following:
• Any interfering Eve gets no information about the input state of Alice.
• If Eve is not interfering then the input state is faithfully transfered to Bob.
MPQCs with abort:
In this case Alice can abort the protocol any time but satisfy the following:
• Before abort any interfering Eve gets no information about the input state of Alice.
• If there is no abort then the input state is faithfully transfered to Bob.
Remark: Consider an implementation of a private quantum channel in which Alice and Bob first use quantum key distribution (QED) protocols like BB84 for key generation and then use these keys to transfer quantum states privately. However it is not strictly an MPQC according to our definition, because current implementations of QEDs require the existence of a classical broadcast channel which is unjam able by Eve. Also such a protocol would not be perfectly secure and there would still be a small amount of information that Eve can obtain even in case Alice does not abort the protocol.
Below we discuss the resource requirements of MPQCs and MPQCEs. The cheating strategies of Eve discussed below work in both type of protocols, with and without abort.
Lemma 5.1 Let P be the distribution of the shared random strings between Alice and Bob in an MPQC for C 2 n . Then S(P ) ≥ n.
Proof: Consider an attack of Eve where she starts acting like Bob. She guesses the random string which has highest probability, say p of occurring. The probability that her guessed string is equal to Alice's random string is at least p. In the event that she guesses Alice's random string correct, she gets to know Alice's input state faithfully at the end of the protocol and Alice does not abort the protocol in this case. Hence from the security criterion, p ≤ 2 −n . This implies S(σ) ≥ n.
We show a similar statement for MPQCEs. This implies that Eve with probability 2 −O(k) gets the same state created with her when Alice and Bob start with σ ′AB as the prior entangled state. Because Tr|σ ′AB − σ AB | ≤ 0.1, Alice's probability of abort ≤ 0.1. Hence the state created with Eve will be the same as the input state of Alice with probability at least (0.8)2 −O(k) . Because of the security criterion (0.8)2 −O(k) ≤ 2 −n ⇒ k = Ω(n).
Conclusion
We have considered private quantum channels with one-way communication of all possible kinds and in all the cases we have shown simultaneously optimal resource requirements. Even when we allow two-way communication but if Eve is allowed arbitrary access to the channel, we show that there is not much saving possible on prior entanglement/shared randomness. However, by allowing a classical broadcast channel between Alice and Bob, unjam able by Eve, saving is possible on prior entanglement/shared randomness by using QKD protocols. So is there a weaker assumption we can make for saving on prior entanglement/shared randomness?
